Abstract. In this paper, we propose a Directed Threshold Multi-Signature Scheme. In this threshold signature scheme, any malicious set of signers cannot impersonate any other set of signers to forge the signatures. In case of forgery, it is possible to trace the signing set. This threshold signature scheme is applicable when the message is sensitive to the signature receiver; and the signatures are generated by the cooperation of a number of people from a given group of senders.
Introduction
Digital signature is a cryptographic tool to authenticate electronic communications. Digital signature scheme allows a user with a public key and a corresponding private key to sign a document in such a way that anyone can verify the signature on the document (using her/his public key), but no one can forge the signature on any other document. This self-authentication is required for some applications of digital signatures such as certification by some authority.
In most situations, the signer is generally a single person. However, in some cases the message is sent by one organization and requires the approval or consent of several people. In these cases, the signature generation is done by more than one consenting person. A common example of this policy is a large bank transaction, by one organization, which requires the signature of more than one partner. Such a policy could be implemented by having a separate digital signature for every required signer, but this solution increases the effort to verify the message linearly with the number of signer. To solve this problems, Multisignature schemes [10, 11, 13, 17, 18] and threshold signature schemes [5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 20] are used where more than one signers share the responsibility of signing messages Threshold signatures are closely related to the concept of threshold cryptography, first introduced by Desmedt [5, 6, 7] . In 1991, Desmedt and Frankel [6] proposed the first (t, n) threshold digital signature scheme based on the RSA system. In (t, n) threshold signature scheme, any subgroup of t or more shareholders of the designated group can generate a valid group signature in such a way that the verifier can check the validity of the signature without identifying the identities of the signers. In threshold schemes, when any t or more shareholders act in collusion, they can impersonate any other set of shareholders to forge the signatures. In this case, the malicious set of signers does not have any responsibility for the signatures and it is impossible to trace the signers. Unfortunately, with threshold schemes proposed so far, this problem cannot be solved.
In multisignature schemes, the signers of a multisignature are identified in the beginning and the validity of the multisignature has to be verified with the help of identities of the signers. For multisignatures, it is indeed unnecessary to put a threshold value to restrict the number of signers.
Consider the situation, where a group of anonymous members would have to generate a multisignature.
The members of this group use pseudonyms as their identities in the public directory. What concerns the verifier most is that a message is signed by at least t members and they indeed come from that group.
Nevertheless, the verifier has no way to verify whether a user is in fact a member of that group because of the anonymity of the membership. In this case, the multisignature schemes cannot solve this problems, however, the threshold signature schemes do.
On the other hands, there are so many situations, when the signed message is sensitive to the signature receiver. Signatures on medical records, tax information and most personal/business transactions are such situations. Signatures used in such situations are called directed signatures [1, 2, 3, 14, 15, 19, 23, 24] . In directed signature scheme, the signature receiver has full control over the signature verification process and can prove the validity of the signature to any third party, whenever necessary.
Nobody can check the validity of signature without his cooperation.
Combining these ideas, we propose a digital signature scheme named as Directed -threshold multisignature scheme. The proposed scheme is based on Shamir's threshold signature scheme [21] and Schnorr signature scheme [22] . These basic tools are briefly described in the next section. This paper is organized as follows: -The section-2 presents some basic tools. Section-3 proposes a Directed -threshold multi -signature scheme. Section-4 discusses the security of the Scheme. An illustration is discussed in section-5.
Remarks are in section-6.
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we will use the following system setting.
• A prime modulous p, where 2 511 < p < 2 512 ;
• A prime modulous q, where 2 159 < q < 2 160 and q is a divisor of p -1;
• A number g, where g k (p -1) /q mod p, k is random integer with 1 k p -1 such that g >1; (g is a generator of order q in Zp * ).
• A collision free one-way hash function h [25] ;
The parameters p, q, g and h are publicly known. Every user has two keys one private and one public.
We assume that a user A chooses a random A 
The signature are verified by checking the equality
Threshold secret sharing scheme is a scheme to distribute a secret key K into n users in such a way that any t users can cooperate to reconstruct K but a collusion of t -1 or less users reveal nothing about the secret. There are many realization of this scheme, we shall use Shamir's scheme. This scheme is based on Lagrange's interpolation in a field. To implement it, a polynomial f of degree t -1 is randomly chosen in Zq such that f (0) = K. Each user i is given a public identity i u and a secret share f ( i u ). Now any subset of t shareholders out of n shareholders can reconstruct the secret K = f (0), by pooling their shares and using
Here we assume that the authorized subset of t users consists of shareholders i for i =1,2,3…t.
Directed -threshold multi -signature scheme
The signer of the conventional digital signature schemes is usually a single person. But when the message m is transmitted by an organization S to a person R and the message requires the approval of more than one person then the responsibility of signing the messages needs to be shared by a subset H S of t or more signer from a designated group G S of n users belonging to the organization S. The signature receiver R can verify the signature and that R can prove its validity to any third party C, whenever necessary. Nobody can check the validity of the signature without the help of R. Both the ( t , n and the couldn't solve this problem independently.
In this paper, we are going to combine the idea of (t, n) and propose a threshold signature scheme, called the Directed -threshold-multisignature scheme, to solve the above problem.
For our construction, we assume that there is a determines the group secret keys, all shareholders's secret shares, and a who takes the responsibility to collect and verify each partial signature and then produce a group signature.
This scheme consists of the following steps: -
3.1.Group Secret Key and Secret Shares Generation for the organization S (a).
selects the group public parameters p, q, g and a collision free one way hash function h [25] . SDC also selects a polynomial
(b). computes the group public key, S y , as,
(c).
randomly selects K ∈ Zq and computes a public value 
3.2.Partial Signature generation by any t users and verification
If any t members of the organization S out of n members agree to sign a message m for a person R. R possesses a pair ( R x , R y ). Then the signature generation has the following steps. 
3.3.Group Signature generation (a).
can computes the group signature S S by combining all the partial signature, as,
sends { S S , U S ,W S , m} to R as signature of the group S on the message m. 
Signature verification by R

3.5.Proof of validity by R to any third party C (a). R computes µ = U S R
x mod p and R R = µ .W S mod p. • R chooses random ∈ Zp computes = w. g α mod p, γ = R x mod p and sends , γ to C.
(b). R sends { R R , E, S S , U S , m, µ} to C. (c). C recovers R S = h (R
• C sends u, v to R, by which R can verify that w = (U S ) u . g v mod p.
• R sends to C, by which she can verify that
Security discussions
In this sub-section, we discuss the security aspects of proposed scheme. Here we discuss several possible attacks. But show that, none of these can successfully break our system. 
(a).
(e). # $
S S =
Obviously, this is computationally infeasible for DC.
A forger may try to impersonate a user i ∈ H S , by randomly selecting two integers Obviously, to compute the integer S S is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm problem. On the other hand, the forger can randomly select R S and S S first, then try to determine a value R R that satisfy the equation
However, according to the property of the hash function h, it is quite impossible. Thus, this attack will not be successful.
(h). "
According to the equation,
, the secret polynomial f S can be reconstructed with the knowledge of any t secret shares, f S (
But in our proposed scheme, the secret shares l i , i ∈ G S , contains the integer K i which only the trusted SDC knows and has to be removed first before reconstructing the polynomial f S (x). A malicious shareholder i may try to retrieve the integer K i from the public key n i. However, the difficulty is same as solving the discrete logarithm problem. Thus, any t or more shareholders cannot conspire to reconstruct the polynomial f S (x) by providing their own secret shares.
Illustration
The following illustration is supporting our scheme for practical implementation. Suppose (b). randomly selects K = 14 and computes a public value W = 2.
(c). computes the secret key, public key, secret share and public value for each member of the group G S , as shown in the following table. (c). R in a zero knowledge fashion proves to C that log 8 16 = log 25 2 as follows:-• C chooses random u = 9, v = 11 and computes w = 25 and sends w to R.
5.2Signature generation by any t users
• R chooses random = 37 computes = 36, γ = 9 and sends , γ to C.
• C sends u, v to R, by which R can verify that w = 25.
• R sends to C, by which she can verify that = 36 and γ = 9.
Remarks
In this paper, we have proposed a Directed -Threshold Multi -signature Scheme. There is a trusted SDC that determine the group secret keys, all shareholders's secret shares, and a designated combiner DC who takes the responsibility to collect and verify each partial signature and then produce a group signature, but no secret information is associated with the DC.
In this threshold signature scheme, any malicious set of signers cannot impersonate any other set of signers to forge the signatures. In case of forgery, it is possible to trace the signing set. Any t or more shareholders acting in collusion cannot conspire to reconstruct the polynomial f S (x) by providing their own secret shares and hence they cannot recover the group secret key.
